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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No, 920401-CA 
v. : 
DENNY ALVAREZ, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. 
Lewis, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court improperly admit the testimony 
of a police officer regarding the findings of a police 
fingerprint examination? While the trial court's determination 
of admissibility of evidence is ultimately a question of law and 
is reviewed for correctness, ,f[the reviewing court] reverse[s] 
only if [it] conclude[s] that [the trial court] acted 
unreasonably in striking the balance". State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
2. Has petitioner demonstrated, through the assertion 
of fresh instances of deficient performance, that his trial 
counsel was ineffective? In making a determination as to whether 
counsel has rendered ineffective assistance, an appellate court 
should consider the totality of the evidence in assessing whether 
(1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990)- When the 
question of trial counsel's ineffectiveness is raised for the 
first time on appeal and the appellate court's review is confined 
to the trial court record, the court determines a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. State v. 
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990). Following a jury trial, defendant 
was convicted of the offense charged (R. 69). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life imprisonment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about 11:00 a.m. on September 7, 1991, defendant 
Denny Alvarez entered the Smith's Food King, located at 8th South 
and 9th East, approached the customer service booth, where 
Vanessa Milton was working, and demanded "six fifties" (R. 183-
86). Ms, Milton asked defendant for the money from which she 
would make the change, but defendant, who had some wadded up 
money in his hand, kept saying, "Just give me the money" (R. 187, 
197-98, 271-76). Upon her refusal to respond after several such 
demands, defendant pulled up his shirt and showed to Ms. Milton 
what appeared to her to be the handle of a gun or a knife, but 
mostly likely the latter, sticking out from the waist of 
defendant's pants (R. 187-88, 203). Alarmed, Ms. Milton reached 
for the intercom and called the store manager for assistance (R. 
188). 
Just as Ms. Milton called for assistance, defendant 
reached through the glass partition, across the counter and 
attempted to turn the key in the money drawer (R. 188-89). 
Defendant's reach across the counter and grab for the keys to 
open the drawer was witnessed by another employee at the customer 
service booth, Cherice Lucero, who was then standing directly 
behind Ms. Milton (R. 213-215). Ms. Milton immediately called 
security, and defendant fled (R. 189). After the incident, Ms. 
Milton "fell apart," shaking and crying, reactions also witnessed 
by Ms. Lucero (R. 191, 216). 
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Defendant fled to a waiting car, parked in the fire 
lane about forty to fifty yards from the front of the store (R. 
228, 232, 272). A couple of Smith's employees, including the 
manager, Phillip Bair, prevented the car from leaving, but then 
shortly removed defendant from the passenger seat (R. 229, 272). 
Officer Mark Scharman of the Salt Lake County Police 
Department responded to a call and arrived at the Smith's within 
minutes (R. 237-38). After arresting defendant, officer Scharman 
located a knife between the passenger seat and the passenger door 
(R. 240). A syringe also fell out of the car at that time (R. 
247). In response to officer Scharman's request, defendant 
identified himself as "Joseph Madrid" and gave a juvenile age (R. 
242). Officer Scharman also found $ 4.61 in defendant's pants 
(R. 247). At trial, Ms. Milton identified the knife as the one 
which she had seen sticking out of defendant's pants (R. 190-91). 
Defendant took the stand and identified himself as 
"Denny Manuel Alvarez" and stated that he was twenty years old 
(R. 264). He also admitted, on direct examination, that for five 
days before the attempted robbery he had been "partying and 
drinking and doing drugs [heroin and cocaine]," and, on the 
morning of the offense, had intravenously injected himself with 
drugs (R. 264-65, 273). Defendant claimed he went to the Smith's 
to get "six fifties," meaning six fifty-cent pieces, because the 
night before a man named "Jesse," with whom he occasionally did 
drugs, bought two half-dollars he happened to have for two 
dollars (R. 270-71, 286). He ran from the store only because he 
4 
saw Smith's' employees running towards him (R. 181). He denied 
having reached across the counter or grabbed the keys (R. 280). 
He also denied having a knife while in the Smith's food store or 
having threatened Ms. Milton with a knife by lifting his shirt, 
explaining instead that, as a result of his intense drug use, he 
had become "wired out," lost weight and had continually to hike 
up his pants to prevent them from falling down over his knees (R. 
266, 268-69, 276-279). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony 
about a police fingerprint report. However, defendant was not 
prejudiced: (1) he offered testimony from which the jury would 
have been bound to infer the same conclusions as that implied by 
the hearsay, i.e., that he had lied to a police officer about his 
name and age; (2) under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
fact of defendant's having lied was relevant to show 
consciousness of guilt; (3) any prejudice accompanying a possible 
negative aspersion about defendant's character from his having 
lied did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the 
evidence; and (4) evidence of guilt was sufficiently great that 
there was no reasonable likelihood of a different result had the 
challenged testimony been excluded. 
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Because defendant has failed to provide any evidence 
about what an uncalled witness would have testified to at trial, 
he has failed to make the required showing of prejudice in 
support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE; HOWEVER, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT OFFERED EVIDENCE ON DIRECT 
EXAMINATION THAT NECESSARILY LED TO THE SAME 
INFERENCE AS THAT CREATED BY THE HEARSAY, THE 
EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT AND MORE PROBATIVE THAN 
PREJUDICIAL, AND EVIDENCE OF GUILT WAS 
OVERWHELMING. 
A. Factual Background to Defendant's 
Evidentiary Challenge. 
Prior to trial defendant moved exclude any references 
to his prior convictions, pursuant to rule 609, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 27). At the hearing on defendant's motion in 
limine, the State stipulated that the prior convictions should be 
suppressed, and the trial court granted the motion (R. 33). 
At trial defendant moved to suppress Officer Scharman's 
anticipated testimony that defendant had given him a false name 
and age at the time of arrest (R. 219-20).l Defendant argued 
that the admission of the false name was evidence of a crime or 
wrong, and was therefore inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (R. 220). Defendant acknowledged that the 
court had already found the evidence relating to his name and age 
1
 The entire colloquy concerning defendant's objection to 
Officer Scharman's anticipated testimony and the court's ruling 
is attached at Appendix B. 
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admissible (presumably, at the previous hearing), but proffered 
that he gave the officer the false name because he was on 
probation for robbery (R. 220-21). Defendant argued that any 
attempt to explain why he gave the false information would 
prejudice him by his having to reveal his probationary status (R. 
221). Therefore, he argued, reference to the false name and age 
should also be suppressed under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(R. 221). 
In response to the trial court's inquiry, the State 
argued that the giving of false information immediately following 
the event was relevant evidence because it bore, in essence, on 
defendant's guilty motive and it refuted, by the deviousness of 
the act, the anticipated defense that he was too confused by 
drugs to control his conduct and behavior (R. 222). 
The trial court ruled that the evidence was relevant 
and that "the probative value weighs [sic] the slight, if any, 
prejudicial effect of the same" (R. 222). The court also found 
that the evidence would not be excluded under rule 404(b) because 
defendant had not been charged with giving a false information to 
the police (R. 223). The court admonished Officer Scharman not 
to make reference to defendant's probation, prior convictions or 
criminal record (R. 223). Finally, the court noted that its 
rulings did not compromise defendant strategically, allowing him 
to either argue the falsity as evidence of his confusion, or to 
otherwise explain its basis if he chose. The trial court, 
however, ordered the State to refrain from cross-examining 
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defendant on the question of probation if defendant chose this 
latter route (R. 223-24). 
Officer Scharman testified that at the time of the 
arrest defendant gave him the name "Joseph Madrid" and a juvenile 
age (R. 242) «2 When asked how he determined that a question 
existed as to the name defendant had given him, Officer Scharman, 
over defendant's hearsay objection, replied, "There was a 
comparative fingerprint done from the print I took at the time of 
the arrest versus some known prints of the defendant" (R. 243-
44). From a supplementary record he discovered that the prints 
of the individual he had arrested and defendant's known prints 
were the same (R. 244). He also discovered, apparently from the 
same report, that defendant was an adult (R. 244). In closing, 
and on rebuttal, the State drew the reasonable inference, and 
argued to the jury, that defendant had lied about his name and 
age when Officer Scharman was attempting to identify him and 
gather basic information about him (R. 322, 341). 
B. The Trial Court Erred in 
Admitting Hearsay Evidence. 
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay: 
"Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." "Hearsay is not 
admissible except as provided by law or by these rules." Utah R. 
Evid. 802. 
2
 The entire colloquy concerning the Officer Scharman's 
challenged testimony is attached at Appendix C. 
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The trial court's determination of admissibility of 
evidence is ultimately a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 
(Utah Apr. 23, 1991). 
Officer Scharman testified to the substance of a police 
report that was the product, in part, of a routine fingerprint 
analysis. No foundation was laid as to his personal knowledge of 
the analysis, nor did the State attempt to introduce the report 
itself, following the laying of a proper foundation, see State 
v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983) (setting out a 
sufficient foundation, generally by the custodian of records, for 
the admission of a booking officer's report under the then-
applicable business records exception to the hearsay rule). 
Therefore, the State concedes defendant's claim on appeal that 
the trial court erred in admitting Officer Scharman's testimony 
concerning the supplementary records containing the results of 
the comparative fingerprint analysis over his hearsay 
objection.3 
3
 Defendant also argues that Officer Scharman's testimony 
was in violation of rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence (Appellant's 
Brief at 10-11). While the policy of insuring evidentiary 
reliability bears on both rule 602 and the hearsay rule, the 
focus of the two rules is different. Rule 602 focuses on the 
knowledge of the witness. The hearsay rules focus on the 
knowledge of the declarant. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET B. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE J 602[01] at 602-5 (1992). Because 
defendant did not make a specific objection based on rule 602, 
this particular ground has not been adequately preserved for 
appeal. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here 
a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing 
unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate 
court will not consider that ground on appeal.") 
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C. Defendant Was Not Prejudiced 
by the Admission of Hearsay. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's error in admitting 
hearsay evidence, defendant suffered no prejudice entitling him 
to a reversal of his conviction. Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, provides, in pertinent part; "Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless 
a substantial right of the party is affected . . . ." See State 
v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986) (noting, in dicta, that 
even if the trial court had erred in excluding hearsay, it did 
not materially prejudice the defendant where the defendant was 
able to elicit other testimony for the same purpose, citing rule 
103). 
It is patent that if a party allows the jury to hear 
certain evidence at one point, he cannot in good faith claim that 
he was prejudiced by the same evidence at another point. In 
State v. Burk, No. 910404-CA, slip. op. (Utah App. October 23, 
1992), Burk claimed that the witness's hearsay testimony 
concerning his intent to "cut her up," prejudiced the jury, 
notwithstanding the trial court's striking the testimony and 
instructing the jury to disregard it. Noting that Burk had 
failed to object to substantially the same testimony from the 
same witness, this Court rejected his argument, finding that the 
objectionable testimony "was not so prejudicial as to deny Burk a 
fair trial." Id. at 6. 
The challenged testimony, alongside other unchallenged 
testimony in this case, presents the same evidentiary picture as 
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in Burk, Defendant objected to hearsay testimony that identified 
him from fingerprint records, not as "Joseph Madrid," but as 
"Denny Alvarez" (R. 243-44). The State concedes that evidence 
was erroneously admitted. However, defendant did not first 
object to Officer Scharman's testimony that defendant had given 
him the name "Joseph Madrid" and a juvenile age when the 
policeman first questioned him, and at the very beginning of his 
direct examination defendant identified himself as "Denny Manuel 
Alvarez" and that he was "twenty" years old (R. 242, 264). Since 
the offense occurred on September 7, 1991, only 9 weeks before 
the trial, the jury would have immediately recognized that 
defendant was not a juvenile when he was arrested. At no time 
during the course of criminal proceedings did defendant move to 
show that he had at any time used the name "Joseph Madrid." 
Contrary to defendant's remarkable contention that "[n]o 
competent or admissible evidence was offered to show that [the 
name of 'Joseph Madrid' and the juvenile date of birth] were 
indeed false" (Appellant's Brief at 11), the jury could only have 
drawn the natural and reasonable inference that defendant 
recognized himself as "Denny Alvarez" and that he had lied to 
Officer Scharman. Indeed, this Court should reject defendant's 
claim of error more readily that it did the defendant's in Burk, 
because in this case it was defendant himself who offered the 
testimony that made clear that he had lied about his name and 
age. 
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D. Evidence of Defendant's Use of 
a False Name and Acre was Relevant 
to Show Intent under Rule 404(b). 
Defendant argues that even if this Court should find 
that the jury was entitled to infer that he had lied about his 
name and age, such evidence was irrelevant and should not have 
been admitted under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. In 
support he apparently argues (1) that the jury would have imputed 
to him the committing of an uncharged crime, i.e., the giving of 
false information to a police officer, and (2) evidence that he 
lied tended to impugn his character, which was not at issue in 
the case (Appellant's Brief at 12-13). 
In State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court set out the analysis for admitting evidence of 
other crimes or bad acts under rule 404(b): 
,f[E]vidence of a defendant's prior crimes or 
bad acts is not admissible to show criminal 
propensity in a criminal case. Such evidence 
may be admitted only if the evidence has a 
very high degree of probativeness with 
respect to a particular element of the crime 
charged and will not otherwise result in 
undue prejudice. That rule has been carried 
into our present rules of evidence by Rule 
404(b) . . . .* However, Rule 404(b) also 
states that prior crimes evidence is 
A
 Rule 404(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
12 
"admissible for other purposes . . . . Thus, 
evidence may be adduced to "establish any of 
the constitutive elements of the crime of 
which the defendant is accused in the case on 
trial, even though such evidence tends to 
prove that the defendant has committed other 
crimes." 
Id. at 963 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accord, State 
v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987). 
Contrary to defendant's claim, however, his lying about his 
name and age were relevant to his intent: 
The use of a false name after the commission 
of a crime is commonly accepted as being 
relevant on the issue of consciousness of 
guilt. See e.g., United States v. Bovle, 675 
F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1982). In this regard, E. 
Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 271(c), at 
803 (3rd ed. 1984) provides: 
"The wicked flee when no man pursueth." 
Many acts of a defendant after the crime 
seeking to escape the toils of the law 
are uncritically received as admissions 
by conduct, constituting circumstantial 
evidence of consciousness of guilt and 
hence of the fact of guilt itself. In 
this class are flight from the scene of 
from one's usual haunts after the crime, 
assuming a false name . . . . 
Kidd v. State, 748 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis 
in the original) (footnotes omitted in the original) (finding 
relevant the defendant's having given a fictitious name to police 
officers asking the defendant to identify himself following a 
high-speed chase in a case of aggravated robbery). Accord, State 
v. Chase, 799 P.2d 272, 275 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (finding 
13 
relevant under rule 401,5 Washington Rules of Evidence, the 
defendant's giving a false name when first interviewed, because 
"it tended to show consciousness of guilt, and thus to further 
inferences of identity and criminal intent"). See also State v. 
Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 432, 361 P.2d 174 (1961) (finding 
relevant the defendant's first denying knowledge of the victim 
and her mother in a statutory rape case, but later admitting 
such. The court stated: "This evidence showing that upon being 
confronted with inquiry about this crime [the defendant] first 
was defensive and evasive by making denials, and later made 
admissions of the truth inconsistent with them, was competent 
evidence because it reasonably could be regarded as manifesting 
an awareness of guilt and a desire to protect himself by 
falsifying to mislead the officers in the investigation.") 
Defendant lied to Officer Scharman about his name and 
age. Officer Scharman, arriving on the scene a few minutes after 
the offense occurred, obviously did not witness defendant's 
5
 Rule 4 01, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except 
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the 
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
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criminal acts (R. 238). Defendant might well have considered 
denying his identity to avoid assuming responsibility for the 
offense, even though he had been detained by Smith's employees 
immediately following the attempted robbery. The State did not 
offer defendant's lying about his name and age for the purpose of 
maligning his character, but, in essence, to demonstrate 
defendant's consciousness of guilt through his deviousness (R. 
222). The trial court agreed, and, ruling prospectively, 
properly found the evidence relevant both as to defendant's 
motive and his lack of confusion, i.e., his deliberateness in 
denying guilt (R. 222-23). 
"Even if evidence of other crimes is probative of a 
particular element of a crime and is not offered merely to show 
criminal predisposition, such evidence is not automatically 
admissible under Rule 404(b). Its tendency to lead the finder of 
fact to an improper basis for decision must still be balanced 
against its probative value and the need for such evidence in 
proving a particular issue." State v. Schickles, 760 P.2d 291, 
195 (Utah 1988). See also State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 
426-27 (Utah 1989) (applying rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, to 
determine the admissibility of prior bad act evidence by weighing 
the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial 
effect).6 
6
 Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in pertinent 
part: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
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A determination of admissibility under rule 403 is a 
fact-intensive question, delegated to the discretion of the trial 
court and reviewed only for abuse of discretion. State v. 
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295-96 (Utah App. 1990). Recognizing that 
the determination of admissibility of evidence under rule 403 is 
a matter of law, review is based on "whether . . . the trial 
court's decision . . . was beyond the limits of reasonability." 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 241, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (citing 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781-82 n.3). 
In Schickles, the court found that "clearly 
prejudicial" evidence of the defendant's sexual abuse of the 
victim was, nonetheless, admissible to show intent to kidnap 
where the issue of intent was hotly contested. Id., at 296. In 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), the court refused to 
apply rules governing character traits where prejudicial evidence 
was not offered to show a trait of defendant's character, but 
rather consciousness of guilt. .Icl. at 65. 
In this case the issue of defendant's culpable state of 
mind was also in dispute. Defendant denied that he reached 
across the counter and tried to turn the key in the money draw, 
or that he even entered the Smith's with a knife (R. 280). 
Defendant explicitly denied that he intended to rob the Smith's 
store (R. 283). Other than defendant's lying to Officer 
Scharman, the State had available no other of defendant's 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice . . . . 
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statements on which to prove defendant's guilty state of mind. 
The trial court found that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighed the slight, if any, prejudicial effect, under rule 403 
(R. 222). Considering the relevance of defendant's 
prevarication, and the need for the evidence, weighed against the 
relatively insignificant character effect of defendant's having 
lied to the policeman, this Court should find the trial court 
ruled properly. 
Defendant also asserts that if the evidence of his 
prevarication were admitted, the jury would impute to him the 
offense of giving false information (Appellant's Brief at 12-13). 
Such an imputation entails no serious prejudice under the facts 
of this case. While lying to a police officer may, depending on 
the facts, cast doubt on character, it does not on its face 
announce an offense. The trial court noted that defendant had 
not been charged with the offense of giving false information to 
a police officer7 and that the State was not treating such 
information so as to suggest such an offense (R. 223). The trial 
court, therefore, held that defendant's lying to a police officer 
was not the "crime" contemplated by rule 404(b) (R. 223). 
Defendant does not cite any evidence in this case, any facts that 
would truly suggest that the average jurymember would have legal 
knowledge of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990), or any legal 
authority that would support his claim. Indeed, apart from the 
7
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990), providing for the 
intentional misleading of a police officer by giving a false 
name, birthdate or address as a class C misdemeanor. 
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claim's general lack of merit, because defendant has failed to 
supply any argument or legal authority in support of his claim, 
this Court should decline to consider it. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
E. Defendant has Failed to Show that 
Challenged Evidence was Substantially 
More Prejudicial Than Probative under 
Rule 403. 
Defendant claims that even if the evidence of his lying 
to a police officer were admissible under rule 404(b), it should 
nonetheless have been excluded under rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence because it was significantly more prejudicial than 
probative. In support he argues: (1) that any inference a jury 
might ordinarily and reasonably make concerning his giving false 
information was absent in this case because the real reason, 
which he did not have the opportunity to refute, was that he was 
on probation; (2) the fact of his having lied to Officer 
Scharman, when the accounts of the events within the Smith's 
store were generally so similar, must have prejudiced the jury in 
considering his intent; and (3) the manner in which his lying to 
the police officer came into evidence, i.e., that the officer had 
determined his identity through a comparison with "known prints," 
informed the jury of his prior criminal history (Appellant's 
Brief at 15-18)• 
1. Denial of Opportunity to Refute 
In making this argument defendant suggests that the 
State should not be able to offer relevant evidence because he 
would be compelled to prejudice his case by offering a truthful 
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explanation. The argument is tantamount to saying that the State 
should not be permitted to put on its case in chief because, if a 
defendant takes the stand to rebut, he runs the risk of being 
impeached. Defendant asserts no constitutional right to be 
insulated from impeachment through his own testimony. 
In this case defendant did take the stand. The trial court 
recognized that defendant could explain his lying to Officer 
Scharman by either offering his explanation or not offering it. 
The trial court reasonably insulated defendant from any 
prejudicial effect by admonishing the State to refrain from 
cross-examining defendant on his prior convictions if he offered 
his probation as an explanation (R. 223-24). Thus, the risk of 
explaining the true reason for his lying reasonably fell on 
defendant, just as it would any defendant facing the risk of 
taking the stand for fear of impeachment. Defendant chose not to 
explain his lying, and he should not now be permitted to complain 
that he was prejudiced by a choice faced by any criminal 
defendant. 
2. Prejudicial Effect of Prevarication on Intent 
The State has argued that defendant's lying to Officer 
Scharman was relevant to establishing defendant's culpable state 
of mind and that the probative value of this evidence outweighed 
the relatively trivial prejudicial effect that such evidence 
might have had in influencing the jury on this point (Appellee's 
Brief at 12-16). Defendant is mistaken in stating that his 
account and that of the State's witnesses was substantially the 
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same, and therefore, the jury must have used the fact of his 
prevarication to find he possessed a guilty mind. In fact, the 
accounts of defendant's actions given Smith's employees was 
significantly different than defendant's account and were more 
than sufficiemt to create a reasonable inference about 
defendant's culpable state of mind (see Statement of Facts, 
Appellee's Brief at 3-5). 
3. "Known Prints" Suggesting Prior Crimes 
Defendant asserts that Officer Scharman's reference to 
the source from which he learned defendant's identity gave the 
jury notice of prior criminal activity which was prejudicial. 
The argument is without merit. 
An offhand reference to "known prints" hardly gives 
notice of prior criminal activity comparable to that announced by 
the defendant in State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985), on 
which defendant relies. In that case the court held that the 
trial court erred in allowing the defendant's statement, 
regarding a ring discovered in a search of his vehicle, "[I]t may 
have been there from a previous burglary." JId. at 194. The 
court found that the statement was inadmissible character 
evidence which the defendant was unable rebut because he did not 
testify, and was irrelevant to proving any element of the 
particular burglary for which he was being tried, .Id. at 194-95. 
Similarly, neither State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987), 
or Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), also cited by defendant, 
are apposite because the challenged evidence was clearly 
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irrelevant to the charges. In DeAlo, this Court found the 
marginal probative value of a California search warrant, 
supporting affidavit and dope ledger, none of which were clearly 
connected to the Utah offense, did not outweigh the prejudicial 
implication that defendant was involved in a major cocaine 
distribution scheme in California. Ld. at 199. In Featherson, 
the court found the defendant's prior sexual assault convictions 
and uncharged assault incidents, the most recent of which 
occurred four years before the aggravated sexual assault charge 
on which he was being tried, and interactions with two women 
several hours before the occurrence of the offense, were all 
irrelevant and unnecessary to prove the defendant's intent. Id. 
at 426-32. 
In all of the cases on which defendant relies, cited 
above, the prior crime evidence was clearly and definitively 
brought to the jury's attention as such. In this case, however, 
the officer's reference to "known prints" does not clearly 
suggest criminal activity. There exist a number of reasons for 
which any law-abiding individual might have his/her fingerprints 
on file with the Bureau of Criminal Identification, i.e., under 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-514 (Supp. 1992), any child care provider 
would be required to supply fingerprints in order to obtain a 
license. Thus, defendant simply speculates that the reference to 
known prints signals prior criminal activity. 
Further, the officer's reference to "known prints" was 
fleeting and not elaborated on. As opposed to authority on which 
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defendant relies, a more fitting precedent relevant to his claim 
is State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988)- In that case 
the prosecutor unintentionally evoked a response from the 
arresting officer which revealed the existence of an outstanding 
warrant for the defendant's arrest in another unrelated matter. 
"The witness's reference to the warrant was very brief and was 
made only in passing, stating no details of the circumstances 
which caused the warrant to issue or of the offense to which it 
was related." Id. at 883. Noting that the trial court obviated 
any prejudice that might have resulted by immediately admonishing 
the jury to disregard the testimony, the court found the error 
harmless. Ibid. 
In this case no motion to strike was made, and on 
appeal defendant does not suggest that the trial court was in 
error in failing to admonish the jury. Furthermore, considering 
the distinct possibility that the jury might not even have 
recognized the possible implication of prior criminality from so 
casual a reference to "known prints," the trial court probably 
minimized whatever prejudicial effect may have attached to the 
statement by choosing not to draw attention to it at all. 
F. Any Error in Admitting Challenged 
Evidence was Harmless Because 
Defendant Testified to Eguivalent 
Bad Acts and Evidence of Guilt 
was Overwhelming. 
"|[A]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence 
based on rule 403 cannot result in reversible error unless the 
error is harmful." Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 240 (citation omitted). 
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Elaborating on the harmless error standard, the court in Hamilton 
said: 
"Harmless" errors are "errors which, 
although properly preserved below and 
presented on appeal, are sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." Although it 
is somewhat difficult to state exactly when 
an error is such that it would result in a 
"reasonable likelihood" of a different 
result, we have attempted to give a more 
accurate definition of such an error in State 
v, Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), where we 
held, "For an error to require reversal, the 
likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
the verdict." id. at 920. . . . 
In making this determination, we 
consider a host of factors, including, among 
others, the importance of the witness's 
testimony to the prosecution's case and the 
overall strength of the State's case. The 
more evidence supporting the verdict, the 
less likely there was harmful error. 
Id. at 240 (citations omitted) (finding harmless any error that 
might have occurred in admitting evidence that the defendant had 
acted violently toward a witness on a prior occasion when the 
great weight of evidence established guilt). 
Any error resulting from the admission of challenged 
testimony in this case was harmless. Any prejudice that might 
have resulted from testimony which, while relevant, reflected on 
defendant's character as a liar or suggested he had a criminal 
background, was made insignificant by defendant's own expansive 
admissions of his unrestricted drug use prior to the offense. 
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Defendant testified that he was high on heroin and cocaine on the 
morning of the offense and for the five days preceding (R. 264-
65): 
MS., REMAL [Defense Counsel]: I want to draw 
your attention and have you recall, if you 
can, generally your activities between 
September 1st and September 7th of this year* 
Do you recall generally what you were doing? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, I was with my friend 
partying and drinking and doing drugs. 
MS. REMAL: Now, when you say partying, what 
do you mean? What does partying include? 
DEFENDANT: Well, drinking beer, staying up 
all night, partying. Just not worrying about 
nothing but just getting high. 
MS. REMAL: All right. Now, you mentioned 
doing drugs. Were there some sort of 
controlled substances that you were 
consuming? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
MS. REMAL: What? 
DEFENDANT: Cocaine and heroin. 
MS. REMAL: And how often during that period 
of time between September 1st and Sept€*mber 
2nd, excuse me, 7th, would you say you 
consumed or used some sort of drugs? 
DEFENDANT: The whole time. 
(R. 264-65). Defendant, through his own testimony, characterizes 
himself not so much as one helplessly caught in the grip of 
addiction, but rather a self-indulgent degenerate. Alongside of 
such self-characterization any prejudice accompanying the 
challenged testimony pales. 
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More significantly, the evidence supporting the jury's 
guilty verdict was overwhelming.8 Ms. Milton, the Smith's 
customer service employee, testified that when she refused to 
give defendant the change he claimed he was asking for, he raised 
his shirt exposing the handle of a weapon sticking out from his 
pants while demanding, "Just give me the money" (R. 187-88). 
Both Ms. Milton and Ms. Lucero, the other customer service 
employee, testified that defendant then reached across the 
counter, grabbed the keys to the money drawer and attempted to 
open the drawer (R. 188-89, 218). When Ms. Milton called for 
assistance, defendant ran from the store (R. 190). Officer 
Scharman, who was on the scene within minutes of the offense, 
located a knife between the door and the passenger seat in which 
defendant had been sitting just minutes after defendant had fled 
the scene (R. 240). Ms. Milton identified the knife as the one 
with which defendant had threatened her (R. 190). Based on such 
evidence, whatever the character aspersions that might have 
attached to the admission of defendant's having lied or having 
8
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990), providing for the 
offense of aggravated robbery, states, in pertinent part as 
follows: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) . . . threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon . . . . 
• • « • 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit . . . a robbery. 
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been previously identified by the police, there is no reasonable 
likelihood of a different outcome had such evidence been 
excluded* 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE THE 
COURT WITH ANY EVIDENCE THAT AN UNCALLED 
WITNESS MIGHT HAVE TESTIFIED FAVORABLY, HIS 
CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
This court recently outlined the analysis applied to 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in State v. 
Severance, 828 P.2d 1066 (Utah App. 1992): 
[An appellate court] review[s] a 
challenge of ineffective assistance of 
counsel by first determining whether 
counsel's performance was deficient and, if 
so, determining whether the deficient 
performance prejudiced defendant. Strickland 
v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 2064 (1984); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Oliver, 
820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
A defendant "must prove that specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The claim may not be 
speculative, but must be a demonstrative 
reality." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. A 
defendant must then show that the deficient 
performance was so prejudicial as to 
"undermine confidence in the reliability of 
the verdict." Id. Accord, Oliver, 820 P.2d 
at 478. That is, a defendant must 
demonstrate there was a reasonable 
probability of a different result at trial. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 n.26 
(Utah 1990). 
Id. at 1070 (emphasis added). When the question of trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal 
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and the appellate court's review is confined to the trial court 
record, the court determines a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel as a matter of law. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 
(Utah App. 1991). 
Tempiin is fully dispositive of defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Tempiin, the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial following his conviction, claiming 
that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. At the 
hearing on the motion he introduced evidence that his trial 
counsel had failed to call two witnesses that would have provided 
exculpatory testimony. On appeal from the trial court's denial 
of his motion, the defendant evidently included in the record 
evidence concerning one of the witness's testimony, but not the 
other's. The court found that based on the record, defendant had 
been denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel had 
failed to interview and call to testify the exculpating witness. 
However, the court also found that the defendant had failed to 
meet his burden of showing that if the other witness had 
testified there would have been a reasonable likelihood of a 
different outcome because "[the defendant] [had] not provided 
this court with any evidence concerning what [the other witness] 
would have testified to if he had been called during trial." Id. 
at 188 n.26. 
Defendant claims that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to call as 
a witness "Jesse," the individual who bought two half-dollars 
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from him the night before the offense for two dollars, and whom 
he claims on appeal is the individual who drove him to the 
Smith's Food Store (Appellant's Brief at 20-23).9 Defendant 
asserts Jesses would have provided supporting evidence concerning 
his innocent intent. However, defendant has failed to provide 
this court with any evidence as to what Jesse's actual testimony 
at trial would have been. Thus, without considering whether 
counsel's performance was deficient, defendant has failed to 
failed to meet his burden on the second prong of the Strickland 
test by his inability to show that he was prejudiced by the lack 
of Jesse's testimony. Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188 n.26; Bundv v. 
DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) (holding that a reviewing 
court need not consider whether counsel's performance was 
deficient if it is easier to dispose of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim because of lack of sufficient 
prejudice). The strength of this conclusion is further bolstered 
by the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt (Appellee's 
Brief at 22-24). See Severance, 828 P.2d at 1070 (finding no 
reasonable probability of a different result at trial where the 
record did not indicate whether a witness would have testified 
more favorably at trial, and evidence against the defendant was 
overwhelming). In sum, this Court should reject defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
9
 Defendant confuses the record in considering "Jesse" and 
the individual, a person "kind of like an uncle," who drove him 
to the Smith's to be the same person. The manner in which 
defendant refers to these persons makes clear that they are 
different people (R. 271-72, 286). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Cc?ur-t to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this y day of November, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General j.AL^z 
KENNETH A- BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
76-6-302 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: . 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as denned in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery5, if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove con-
duct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted 
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of Ms charac-
ter offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced suffi-
cient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. 
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testi-
mony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions, of Rule 703, 
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a) General rule. For the puipose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect 
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of 
the punishment 
APPENDIX B 
1 I The bailiff will escort you out via the jury 
2 I room. 
3 I Mr. Spikes and Ms. Remal will you approach, 
4 I please? 
5 J (The jury left the courtroom.) 
6 J (Side bar conference.) 
7 I THE COURT: Let me just indicate the jury's been 
8 J excused. We're taking our noon recess, we'll reconvene at 
9 I 1:30. I have asked Mr. Spikes to advise his witnesses that 
10 J are in the hall to exercise great caution in not making any 
11 I comments in the presence of the jurors, and in waiting to 
12 J leave the building until the jurors have done so. 
13 J We're in recess. 
14 I (Noon recess.) 
15 I THE COURT: Let me note for the record that we're 
16 J back in the matter of State of Utah versus Denny Alvarez, 
17 J 911901367. The defendant is present with counsel, the 
18 I state is represented, and the jury is not present. 
19 J I will further indicate that counsel has 
20 I discussed with me in chambers during the break a matter 
21 J pertaining to some anticipated police and law enforcement 
22 officer testimony. Ms. Remal, would you like to put your 
23 J position on the record? 
24 J MS. REMAL: Yes, Your Honor. I indicated to you 
25 I in chambers that I anticipated that Officer Scharman, who 
00219 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
1 J is one of the state1s witnesses, will be called, and will 
2 I be asked to indicate to the jury that at the time that he 
3 I apprehended Mr. Alvarez, he asked Mr. Alvarez what his name 
4 I was, Mr. Alvarez gave the name of Joseph Madrid. 
5 I It is my motion in limine to ask the court to 
6 I preclude the state from asking that particular question 
7 I about the false name which Mr. Alvarez gave at that time, 
8 J based on Rule 404-B of the rules of evidence, and also on 
9 J Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
10 J 404-B indicates that generally evidence of other 
11 I crimes and wrongs are not admissible, and I would indicate 
12 J to the court that the giving of the false name would be 
13 J such a crime or wrong that should not be admissible. 
14 J I would indicate further, and did in chambers, 
15 that if the court found under 404-B that the statement was 
16 admissible, that I would still ask the court to make a 
17 J ruling under 403 which indicates that the court ought to, 
18 I basically, balance a piece of evidence as to its prejudice 
19 I versus its probative value. 
20 J The reason I have concern about it is that, in 
21 I truth, as the court knows, Mr. Alvarez is on probation for 
22 la robbery pursuant to a motion in limine that we resolved 
23 I last week. The court ruled that his prior convictions, 
24 I including the fact that he's on probation for robbery, is 
25 I not admissible. But in truth, the explanation that he 
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JTL 
1 J would give, if allowed, as to why he gave the false name at 
2 I the time of being apprehended, was that he was on probation 
3 J for a robbery. 
4 1 In my opinion, it boxes him in, in a way that, in 
5 I order to explain to the jury why he gave the false name, he 
6 I would be forced to reveal to them his prior record, which 
7 I the court has already ruled is so prejudicial that it ought 
8 J not to be made known to the jury. 
9 I So for that reason I ask the court to, under both 
10 I rules, 403 and 404-B, to exclude that continuing piece of 
11 J evidence. It's my understanding that you ruled that under 
12 J both those rules it would be admissible, although you have 
13 indicated that although you'll allow Mr. Spikes to ask the 
14 I officer about that statement, that he is not allowed to 
15 I cross examine Mr. Alvarez or to ask questions of the 
16 J officer as to any further explanation about that. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Let me just Mr. 
18 I Spikes, do you wish to be heard? 
19 J MR. SPIKES: Your Honor, I think Ms. Remal has 
20 I basically stated everybodyfs position. It's simply our 
21 J position that it is probative evidence, that we should be 
22 I allowed to present that to the jury, that, in fact, he did 
23 I give a false name and a false date of birth when confronted 
24 I by the police outside of the Smith's. 
25 I THE COURT: How do you feel that this is relevant 
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1 J and probative? 
2 1 MR. SPIKES: Your Honor, I think it's relevant 
3 I and probative in a couple of areas. One, I think it's 
4 I evidence* of guilt if somebody's apprehended and discusses a 
5 I matter shortly after an alleged crime has occurred, and 
6 I gives a false name and date of birth, I think that's at 
7 I least information that should go into the overall equation. 
8 I Number two, the hypothesis presented by Ms. Remal 
9 J initially was that Mr. Alvarez was so out of it on drugs 
10 I that he wasn't thinking straight, he wasn't in control of 
11 J his conduct and behavior. We see this as evidence of being 
12 J devious. 
13 I THE COURT: Motive, and his lack of confusion? 
14 J MR. SPIKES: Clearly he was thinking in the sense 
15 I that he gave a different date of birth that resulted in his 
16 being treated as a juvenile, and booked in through the 
17 juvenile facility, rather than through the adult facility. 
18 J THE COURT: All right, let me indicate at this 
19 J time that I have carefully considered this issue, and I'm 
20 I going to find at this point in time that the testimony from 
21 J the police officer concerning the defendant's giving of the 
22 J false name and date of birth is relevant, that it is 
23 probative, and that under the 403 balancing test, which I 
24 J have considered and applied, the probative value weighs the 
25 J slight, if any, prejudicial effect of the same. I think 
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this is probative to the point that the prosecutor has 
brought up. 
I will also find under 404-B that this is not 
evidence of a crime, as contemplated by 404-B, or a wrong, 
as the rule contemplates it. Certainly he is not charged 
with giving false information to a police officer, and the 
state is not treating this information in that manner. 
However, I111 note for the record that the police 
officer whose testimony is the subject of this motion is 
present. I'm going to admonish you at this time, officer, 
you are not in any way to mention, regardless of what 
question is put to you, the defendants probation status, 
the fact that he had any convictions, or that you had any 
knowledge at any point in time of a criminal record. Do 
you understand me on that? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, mafam. 
THE COURT: Further, I am going to advise the 
state that it is my clear perception that this ruling does 
not in any way lock the defendant in. And as I indicated 
in chambers, Ms. Remal, the determination of how you wish 
to handle this strategically is up to you. 
And I see that there are a number of different 
approaches. One of them is that you donft need to address 
this issue. Secondarily, it seems to tie in with your 
theory that the defendant was acting in a confused manner, 
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1 J and you don't have to offer any explanation beyond that. 
2 1 If, however, you choose to have the defendant 
3 J offer an explanation, I am precluding the state from cross 
4 J examining in that area for fear that it will get into this 
5 I area of the prior conviction and the probation status. And 
6 J I will note for the record that that was the subject of a 
7 J pretrial motion. 
8 J However, let me clarify that while it is clearly 
9 J my understanding, and it is my order that based upon that 
10 I there is to be no inquiry into this area of probation 
11 I status or prior arrest or conviction, I did not make a 
12 J ruling in connection with that. Rather, that was the 
13 J subject of a stipulated agreement between the parties. 
14 J Itfs my understanding, Mr. Spikes carefully 
15 J reviewed the prior conviction, or convictions—I'm not even 
16 J clear what conviction or convictions exist—and determined 
17 I that under the present case law and rules they were not 
18 I appropriate. Is that a fair statement? 
19 J MR. SPIKES: That's correct, Your Honor. 
20 I THE COURT: So it is clearly understood by both 
21 J sides that that will not come up. I want to be clear to 
22 J all, including the witness, I do not want a mistrial. So I 
23 I want no mention of arrest, I want no mention of probation, 
24 J of anything along those lines. Do you have any questions, 
25 I officer, as to what is fair and what is not under my 
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1 J ruling? 
2 MR. SCHARMAN: No, Your Honor* 
3 J THE COURT: All right. If, as the questioning 
4 I occurs, you become confused or concerned about how you can 
5 I answer a particular question, before you answer, ask for a 
6 J recess to give Mr. Spikes an opportunity to confer with 
7 J you. I do not want to even run the risk of a mistrial. 
8 I And again, I want to protect the defendant's 
9 I rights, and it is my clear belief that there is nothing 
10 J about this ruling that forces the defendant into giving any 
11 I explanation as to his probation status. 
12 J Is there anything further, Ms. Remal? 
13 I MS. REMAL: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right, let's call the jury in. 
15 I (The Jury returned to the courtroom, and the 
16 J following proceedings were held:) 
17 J THE COURT: Let the record reflect that we're 
18 I back in session in the matter of State of Utah versus 
19 I Alvarez. Mr. Alvarez is present, as are counsel for both 
20 I the defendant and the state, and all of the jurors are 
21 I present and accounted for. 
22 I Ladies and gentlemen, let me just say one thing. 
23 I We stand up when you come in, and you stand up when I come 
24 J in. Not because anyone in this courtroom is more important 
25 J than anyone else, but because of how important our system 
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were asking such that he could respond? 
A Yes. 
Q And did he, in fact, respond to those questions? 
A Yes, sir, he did* 
Q What name did he give you when you asked him his 
name? 
A I believe it was Joseph Madrid, or something of 
that nature. 
Q And what date of birth did he give you? 
A I don't recall exactly. I just recall that the 
date of birth, he was a juvenile age. 
Q So what action did you take upon receiving that 
information? 
A Because of the nature of the crime, it's policy 
dictates for us officers, I took him to the police 
department where the SOCO unit photographed him and 
fingerprinted him. 
Q Would you indicate what that is? 
A There's officerfs mobile crime labs and so forth 
there responsible for fingerprints and photographs and 
things of that nature. 
Q Did you know what the ultimate process was? 
A Just that we photographed him and fingerprinted 
him, I made contact with an uncle, and then I transported 
him to the detention center. 
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1 1 Q Do you know at what point it was determined that 
2 I he, in fact, was not Mr. Madrid? 
3 1 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, Ifd object without some 
4 I further foundation. 
5 THE COURT: Will you lay some additional 
6 J foundation, Mr. Spikes? 
7 J Q (BY MR. SPIKES) Did you have occasion to 
8 J discover that the name that he gave you was not, in fact, 
9 J his true name? 
10 I A No, sir, I didn9t, not until I was subpoenaed 
11 I and pulled the case up and read some supplementary reports. 
12 I Q And what information did you gather during, or 
13 I through that process? 
14 I A That the information given to me was not- -
15 J MS. REMAL: Your Honor, it sounds like this is 
16 I based on hearsay, and I'd object unless there's some other 
17 J foundation for the answer. 
18 J THE COURT: Well he can give his understanding of 
19 I the information, if he knows. I111 have you rephrase the 
20 I question, Mr. Spikes. 
21 Q (BY MR. SPIKES) How was it that you, in fact, 
22 I found that there was at least some question concerning the 
23 J name of Madrid that he gave you? 
24 I A From a follow-up detective. 
25 I Q Do you know what process, what procedure was 
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1 I taken that would occur to determine that? 
2 J A There was a comparative fingerprint done from 
3 J the print I took at the time of the arrest versus some 
4 I known prints of the defendant. 
5 J Q Okay. Do you know the results of that 
6 I comparison? 
7 1 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, again Ifd object, this is 
8 I hearsay. 
9 J THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer. 
10 J THE WITNESS: Just I read in the supplementary 
11 J record that the individual I arrested versus the print of 
12 I the other individual were in fact the same. 
13 Q (BY MR. SPIKES) And with respect to the 
14 I juvenile status, based on the date of birth of the 
15 I individual that you arrested, did you discover additional 
16 I information? 
17 J A That he was an adult, is all. 
18 J Q Did you gather any other evidence from Mr. 
19 J Alvarez at the time that you booked him under the name of 
20 Mr. Madrid? 
21 I A The knife and the money is what was placed in 
22 I evidence. 
23 I THE COURT: Lean into the microphone, please, and 
24 J repeat your answer. 
25 THE WITNESS: The knife that was taken out of the 
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